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Bi-modal Go¨del logic over [0,1]-valued
Kripke frames
Xavier Caicedo ∗ Ricardo Oscar Rodr´ıguez †
Abstract
We consider the Go¨del bi-modal logic determined by fuzzy Kripke
models where both the propositions and the accessibility relation are
infinitely valued over the standard Go¨del algebra [0,1] and prove strong
completeness of Fischer Servi intuitionistic modal logic IK plus the pre-
linearity axiom with respect to this semantics. We axiomatize also the
bi-modal analogues of T, S4, and S5 obtained by restricting to mod-
els over frames satisfying the [0,1]-valued versions of the structural
properties which characterize these logics. As application of the com-
pleteness theorems we obtain a representation theorem for bi-modal
Go¨del algebras.
In a previous paper [6], we have considered a semantics for Go¨del modal
logic based on fuzzy Kripke models where both the propositions and the
accessibility relation take values in the standard Go¨del algebra [0,1], we
call these Go¨del-Kripke models, and we have provided strongly complete
axiomatizations for the uni-modal fragments of this logic with respect to
validity and semantic entailment from countable theories. The systems G
and G✸ axiomatizing the -fragment and the ✸-fragment, respectively, are
obtained by adding to Go¨del-Dummet propositional calculus the following
axiom schemes and inference rules:
G: (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ
From ϕ, infer ϕ
G✸: ✸(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (✸ϕ ∨✸ψ)
✸¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬✸ϕ
¬✸⊥
From ϕ→ ψ, infer ✸ϕ→ ✸ψ
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These logics diverge substantially in their model theoretic properties. Thus,
G does not have the finite model property while G✸ does, and the first
logic is characterized by models with {0,1}-valued accessibility relation
(accessibility-crisp models) while the second does not. Similar results were
obtained for the uni-modal Go¨del analogues of the classical modal logics T
and S4 determined by Go¨del-Kripke models over frames satisfying, respec-
tively, the [0,1]-valued version of reflexivity, or reflexivity and transitivity.
The axiomatization of the uni-modal Go¨del analogues of S5 remains open.
It is the main purpose of this paper to show that the full bi-modal
logic based in Go¨del-Kripke models is axiomatized by the system G✸ which
results of adding to the union of G and G✸ Fischer-Servi´s connecting
axioms [14]:
✸(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✸ψ)
(✸ϕ→ ✷ψ)→ ✷(ϕ→ ψ),
and to extend this completeness result to the bi-modal Go¨del analogues of
classical T, S4, and S5.
The many valued Kripke interpretation of bi-modal logic utilized in this
paper was proposed originally by Fitting [15], [16] with a complete Heyting
algebra as algebra of truth values, and he gave a complete axiomatization
assuming the algebra was finite and the language had constants for all the
truth values. In [20] and [21] transformations and characterization of frame
properties for these models are given in the general case. Bou, Esteva, and
Godo [5] have proposed to utilize this kind of interpretation for general
algebras in the study of fuzzy modal logics.
Our method of proof do not seem to extend easily, however, to alge-
bras distinct from the Go¨del algebra [0,1] and we do not know any other
completeness result for this type of semantics for a fixed algebra H, except
Fitting´s quoted above and Metcalfe & Olivetti completeness of a natural
deduction system for the -fragment of our Go¨del-modal logic [22].
G✸ may be shown deductively equivalent to the system IK introduced
by Fischer-Servi [14] as the natural intuitionistic counterpart of classical
modal logic, plus the prelinearity axiom: (ϕ→ ψ)∨ (ψ → ϕ). Similarly, the
Go¨del analogue of bi-modal S5 results equivalent to the system MIPC of
Prior [26] plus prelinearity.
IK and its extensions have been extensively studied, either by means
of classical Kripke models for intuitionism equipped with extra relations
commuting with the order to interpret the modal operators. ([28], [24],
[25], [10], [29], [30], [17], [7], [9]), or by means of algebraic interpretations,
specially in the case of MIPC, known to be complete for values in monadic
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Heyting algebras ([4], [24], [13], [1], [2]) A major result is that under these
semantics IK and MIPC enjoy the finite model property.
Clearly, G✸ and its modal extensions inherit these semantics by asking
the multirelational Kripke frames to be linearly ordered or the algebras to
be Go¨del algebras, but these alternative interpretations do not have the
standard character of Go¨del-Kripke semantics relevant to fuzzy logic, nor
seem our results reducible to their properties. For example, the formula
¬¬θ → ¬¬θ has finite counter-models in them but not in Go¨del-Kripke
semantics. We discuss briefly at the end of the paper an embedding of our
semantics into algebraic semantics and utilize our completeness theorem to
show a representation theorem for countable bi-modal Go¨del algebras.
1 Go¨del Kripke models
The language L✸(V ar) of propositional bi-modal logic is built from a set
V ar of propositional variables, connectives symbols ∨,∧,→,⊥, and the
modal operators symbols  and ✸. Other connectives are defined as usual:
⊤ := ϕ→ ϕ, ¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥, ϕ←→ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). We will write
L✸ if the set V ar is understood.
Recall that a linear Heyting algebra, or Go¨del algebra in the fuzzy litera-
ture, is a Heyting algebra satisfying the identity (x⇒ y)g(y ⇒ x) = 1. The
variety of these algebras is generated by the standard Go¨del algebra [0, 1],
the ordered interval with its unique Heyting algebra structure. Let the sym-
bols ·,⇒,g, and denote, respectively, the meet, residuum (implication), and
join operations of [0, 1].1
Definition 1.1 A Go¨del-Kripke model (GK-model) will be a structure
M = 〈W,S, e〉 where W is a non-empty set of objects that we call worlds of
M, and S : W ×W → [0, 1], e : W × V ar → [0, 1] are arbitrary functions.
The pair 〈W,S〉 will be called a GK-frame.
The function e : W × V ar → [0, 1] associates to each world x a valuation
e(x,−) : V ar → [0, 1] which extends to e(x,−) : L✸(V ar) → [0, 1] by
defining inductively on the construction of the formulas (we utilize the same
symbol e to name the extension):
e(x,⊥) := 0
e(x, ϕ ∧ ψ) := e(x, ϕ) · e(x, ψ)
1The join operation is definable in Go¨del algebras as x g y = ((x ⇒ y) ⇒ y)) · ((y ⇒
x)⇒ x))
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e(x, ϕ ∨ ψ) := e(x, ϕ) g e(x, ψ)
e(x, ϕ→ ψ) := e(x, ϕ)⇒ e(x, ψ)
e(x,⊥) := 0
e(x,✷ϕ) := infy∈W {Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)}
e(x,✸ϕ) := supy∈W{Sxy · e(y, ϕ)}.
Truth, validity and entailment are defined as follows for ϕ ∈ L✸, T ⊆ L✸:
- ϕ is true in M at x, written M |=x ϕ, if e(x, ϕ) = 1.
- ϕ is valid in M, written M |= ϕ, if M |=x ϕ at any world x of M.
- ϕ is GK-valid , written |=GK ϕ, if M |= ϕ for any GK-model M .
- T |=GK ϕ if and only if for any GK-model M and any world x in M :
M |=x θ for all θ ∈ T implies M |=x ϕ.
It is routine to verify that all axiom schemes corresponding to identities
satisfied by [0, 1]; that is, the laws of Go¨del-Dummet logic, are GK-valid.
In addition
Proposition 1.1 The following schemes are GK-valid:
K (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
K✸ ✸(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (✸ϕ ∨✸ψ)
F✸ ¬✸⊥
FS1 ✸(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✸ψ)
FS2 (✸ϕ→ ✷ψ)→ ✷(ϕ→ ψ).
Proof: Let M = 〈W,S, e〉 be a GK-model. (K) By definition and prop-
erties of the residuum, e(x,(ϕ → ψ)) · e(x,ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ (e(y, ϕ) ⇒
e(y, ψ)) · (Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(y, ψ)) for any y ∈ W . Taking the
meet over y in the last expression: e(x,(ϕ → ψ)) · e(x,ϕ) ≤ e(x,ψ),
hence e(x,(ϕ → ψ)) ≤ e(x,ϕ → ψ). (K✸) By distributivity and
properties of the join: e(✸(ϕ ∨ ψ)) = supy{Sxy · (e(y, ϕ) g e(y, ψ))} =
supy{Sxy ·e(y, ϕ)}gsupy{Sxy ·e(y, ψ)}. (F✸) e(x,✸⊥) = supy{Sxy ·0} = 0.
(FS1) Sxy·e(x,✷ϕ)·e(y, ϕ → ψ) ≤ Sxy·(Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ))·(e(y, ϕ) ⇒ e(y, ψ))
≤ Sxy · e(y, ψ)) ≤ e(x,✸ψ). Therefore, Sxy · e(y, ϕ → ψ) ≤ (e(x,✷ϕ) ⇒
e(x,✸ψ)), and taking the join over y in the left hand side, we have
e(x,✸(ϕ→ ψ)) ≤ e(x,✷ϕ→ ✸ψ). (FS2) e(x,✸ϕ→ ✷ψ) ≤ [Sxy ·e(y, ϕ)⇒
(Sxy ⇒ e(y, ψ))] = [Sxy · e(y, ϕ)⇒ e(y, ψ)] = (Sxy ⇒ (e, y → ψ)). 
Remark. Changing the algebra [0, 1] to a complete Heyting algebra
H in the above definitions we have Kripke models valued in a H (HK-
models) and the corresponding notion of HK-validity. Then all laws of the
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intermediate logic determined by H are HK-valid, and also Proposition 1.1
holds.
2 A deductive calculus
Let G be some axiomatic version of Go¨del-Dummet propositional calculus;
that is, Heyting calculus plus the prelinearity axiom (ϕ → ψ) → (ψ →
ϕ), and let ⊢G denote deduction in this logic. Let L(X) denote the set of
formulas built by means of the connectives ∧,→, and ⊥, from a given set X.
For simplicity, the extension of a valuation v : X → [0, 1] to L(X) according
to the Heyting interpretation of the connectives will be denoted also v.It is
well known that this system is complete for validity with respect to these
valuations and the distinguished value 1. We will utilize the fact that it is
actually sound and complete in the following strong way (see [6]):
Proposition 2.1 i) If T∪{ϕ} ⊆ L(X), then T ⊢G ϕ implies inf v(T ) ≤ v(ϕ)
for any valuation v : X → [0, 1]. ii) If T is countable, and T 0G ϕi1 ∨ ..∨ϕi1
for each finite subset of a countable family {ϕi}i there is a valuation v : L→
[0, 1] such that v(θ) = 1 for all α ∈ T and v(ϕi) < 1 for all i.
For an example that completeness for [0,1]-valued entailment can not be
extended to uncountable theories see Section 3 in [6] and also Proposition
3.1 in this paper.
Definition 2.1 G✸ is the deductive calculus obtained by adding to G the
schemes K, K✸, F✸, FS1, FS2 of Proposition 1.1 and the inference rules:
NR From ϕ infer ϕ
RN✸ From ϕ→ ψ infer ✸ϕ→ ✸ψ.
Proofs with assumptions are allowed with the restriction that NR and
RN✸ may be applied only when the premise is a theorem. Let ⊢G✸denote
deduction in this system.
The restriction on the application of the rules allows the following con-
venient reduction (see [6]).
Lemma 2.1 Let ThG✸ be the set of theorems of G✸ with no assumptions,
then for any theory T and formula ϕ in L✷✸ : T ⊢G✷✸ ϕ if and only if
T ∪ ThG✸ ⊢G ϕ.
and the Deduction Theorem:.
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Lemma 2.2 T, ψ ⊢G✷✸ ϕ implies T ⊢G✷✸ ψ → ϕ.
The following are theorems of G✷✸. The first one is given as an axiom
in Fitting [15], the next two show that G✸ is just the union of G, G✸ plus
the Fischer Servi axioms, and the last one will be useful in our completeness
proof.
T1. ¬✸θ ←→ ¬θ
T2. ¬¬θ → ¬¬θ
T3. ✸¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬✸ϕ
T4. (ϕ→ ✸ψ) ∨((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ)
To see this, we write temporarily ⊢ for ⊢G✷✸, then
(T1) ¬✸θ ⊢ (✸θ → ⊥) ⊢ (θ → ⊥) by Heyting calculus and FS2.
Similarly, ✸θ ⊢ ✸(¬θ → ⊥) ⊢ ¬θ → ✸⊥ ⊢ ¬¬θ by Heyting calculus,
RN✸, and FS2; hence, ¬θ ⊢ ¬✸θ.
(T2) (ϕ → ⊥) → ⊥ ⊢ (ϕ → ✸⊥) → ⊥ ⊢ ✸(ϕ → ⊥) → ⊥ ⊢
((ϕ→ ⊥)→ ⊥) by F✸, FS2, and FS1.
(T3) From FS1, ⊢ ✸(¬ϕ → ⊥)→ (✷¬ϕ → ✸⊥); that is, ⊢ ✸(¬¬ϕ)→
(¬✸ϕ→ ⊥) by T1 and F✸.
(T4) By prelinearity: ⊢ (ϕ → ✸(ϕ → ψ)) ∨ (✸(ϕ → ψ) → ϕ), but
ϕ → ✸(ϕ → ψ) ⊢ ϕ → (ϕ → ✸ψ) ⊢ ϕ → ✸ψ by FS1; moreover,
✸(ϕ → ψ) → ϕ ⊢ ((ϕ → ψ) → ϕ) ⊢ ((ϕ → ψ) → ψ) by FS2, Heyting
calculus and RN.
Theorem 2.1 (Soundness) T ⊢G✷✸ ϕ implies T |=GK ϕ.
Proof: Clearly, the Modus Ponens rule preserves truth at every world of
any GK-model M . Moreover, M |= ϕ implies M |= ϕ, trivially, and
M |= ϕ → ψ implies M |= ✸ϕ → ✸ψ because if e(x, ϕ → ψ) = 1 for all x
then Sxy · e(y, ϕ) ≤ Sxy · e(y, ψ) ≤ e(x,✸ψ) for all x, y, and taking the join
in the left, e(x,✸ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ψ). The rest follows from Proposition 1.1. 
It is easy to provide counterexamples to the validity of ¬¬θ → ✸θ
and ¬✸¬θ → θ, thus the modal operators are not interdefinable in G✸
in the classical manner. In fact, they are not interdefinable in any way. For
example, the formula ¬¬θ → ¬¬θ is not expressible in terms of ✸ alone
because the ✸-fragment has the finite model property with respect to the
number of worlds while this formula has not finite counterexamples as shown
in [6].
Remark. G✸ may be seen deductively equivalent to Fischer-Servi system
IK (cf. [14]) plus the prelinearity axiom, replacing K with the axiom
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(ϕ ∧ ψ) → (ϕ ∧ ψ) and the rule and NR with From ϕ → ψ infer
ϕ → ψ. Actually, T1, T2, T3 are theorems of IK, and we have that
T ⊢IK ϕ implies T |=HK ϕ for any complete Heyting algebra H.
3 Completeness
To prove strong completeness of G✸ with respect to entailment from count-
able theories in Go¨del-Kripke semantics, our strategy is to show this for
finite theories first, and then utilize a first order compactness argument to
lift it to countable theories. To show weak completeness we define for each
finite fragment F ⊆ L✸ (that is, a subset closed under subformulas and
containing the formula ⊥) a canonical model.
Denote by L✸ and ✸L✸ the sets of formulas in L✸ starting with 
and ✸, respectively, and set X := L✸ ∪✸L✸, then clearly L✸(V ar) =
L(V ar ∪X). Recall that ThG✸ denotes the set of theorems of G✸.
The canonical model MF = (W,S
F , eF ) is defined as follows.
W : is the set of valuations v : V ar ∪ X → [0, 1] such that v(ThG✸) = 1
when ThG✸ is considered as a subset of L(V ar ∪X).
SF : SF vw = infψ∈F {(v(✷ψ)→ w(ψ)) · (w(ψ) → v(✸ψ))}.
eF : eF (v, p) = v(p) for any p ∈ V ar.
Weak completeness will follow from the following lemma which unfortu-
nately has a rather involved proof.
Lemma 3.1 . eF (v, ϕ) = v(ϕ) for any ϕ ∈ F and any v ∈W . .
Proof: We prove this by induction in the complexity of the formulas in F,
now considered a subset of L✸(V ar). For ⊥ and the propositional variables
in F the equation holds by definition. The only non trivial inductive steps
are: eF (v,✷ϕ) = v(✷ϕ) and eF (v,✸ϕ) = v(✸ϕ) for ✷ϕ,✸ϕ ∈ F. By the
inductive hypothesis we may assume that eF (v′, ϕ) = v′(ϕ) for every v′ ∈W,
thus we must prove
inf
v′∈W
{SF vv′ ⇒ v′(ϕ)} = v(✷ϕ)) (1)
sup
v′∈W
{SF vv′ · v′(ϕ)} = v(✸ϕ)) (2)
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By definition, SF vv′ ≤ (v(✷ϕ) ⇒ v′(ϕ)) and SF vv′ ≤ (v′(ϕ) ⇒ v(✸ϕ))
for any ϕ ∈ F and v′ ∈ W ; therefore, v(✷ϕ) ≤ (SF vv′ ⇒ v′(ϕ)) and
SF vv′ · v′(ϕ) ≤ v(✸ϕ). Taking the meet over v′ in the first inequality and
the join in the second,
v(✷ϕ) ≤ inf
v′∈W
{SF vv′ ⇒ v′(ϕ)}, sup
v′∈W
{SF vv′ · v′(ϕ)} ≤ v(✸ϕ).
Hence, if v(✷ϕ) = 1 and v(✸ϕ) = 0 we obtain (1) and (2), respectively.
Therefore, it remains only to prove the next two claims for ✷ϕ,✸ϕ ∈ F .
Claim 1. If v(✷ϕ) = α < 1 and ε > 0 there exists a valuation w ∈W such
that SF vw > w(ϕ) and w(ϕ) < α+ ε. That is, (SF vw ⇒ w(ϕ)) < α+ ε.
Claim 2. If v(✸ϕ) = α > 0 then for any ε > 0 there exists w ∈ W such
that SF vw · w(ϕ) ≥ α− ε.
Proof of Claim1. Assume v(✷ϕ) = α < 1 and define (all formulas involved
belonging to L✸(V ar))
Γϕ,v = {θ : v(✷θ) > α} ∪ {θ1 → θ2 : v(✸θ1) ≤ v(θ2)}
∪{(θ2 → θ1)→ θ1 : v(✸θ1) < v(θ2)}.
Then we have v(ξ) > α for each ξ ∈ Γϕ,v. For the first set of formulas by
construction. For the second because v((θ1 → θ2)) ≥ v(✸θ1 → θ2) = 1
by FS2. For the third, because v(θ2 → ✸θ1) < 1 and thus v(((θ2 →
θ1)→ θ1)) = 1 by T4. This implies that
Γϕ,v 6⊢G✸ ϕ.
Otherwise it would exist ξ1, . . . , ξk ∈ Γϕ,v such that: ξ1, . . . , ξk ⊢G✸ ϕ.
Hence, ✷ξ1, . . . ,✷ξk ⊢G✸ ✷ϕ, that is ✷ξ1, . . . ,✷ξk, ThG✸ ⊢ ✷ϕ by Lemma
2.1 and thus by Proposition 2.1 (i)
α < inf v({✷ξ1, . . . , v(✷ξk)} ∪ ThG✸) ≤ v(ϕ) = α,
a contradiction. Therefore, there exists by Proposition 2.1 (ii) a valuation
u : V ar ∪ X 7→ [0, 1] such that u(Γ1ϕ,v ∪ ThG✸) = 1 and u(ϕ) < 1. This
implies the following relations between v and u that we list for further use
(see Figure 1). Given θ1, θ2, θ3,
#1. If v(✷θ) > α then u(θ) = 1 (since then θ ∈ Γ1ϕ,v)
#2 If v(✸θ1) ≤ v(θ2) then u(θ1) ≤ u(θ2) (since then θ1 → θ2 ∈ Γ
1
ϕ,v)
#3 If v(✸θ1) < v(θ2) then u(θ1) = 1 or u(θ1) < u(θ2) (because then
(θ2 → θ1)→ θ1) ∈ Γ
1
ϕ,v)
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Figure 1: First Translation
#4. If u(θ2) < u(θ1) then v(θ2) < v(✸θ1) (counter-reciprocal of 2)
#5. If v(✷θ2) > 0 then u(θ2) > 0 (making θ1 := ⊥ in 3 because u(⊥) =
v(✸⊥) = 0)
#6. If u(θ2) ≤ u(θ1) < 1, then v(θ2) ≤ v(✸θ1) (counter-reciprocal of 3).
For the next construction we need the finiteness of F. Set B = {v(θ) :
θ ∈ F} and for each b ∈ B define
ub = min{u(θ) : θ ∈ F, v(θ) = b},
and then define a strictly descending sequences b0, b1, ..., bN = 0 in B as
follows:
b0 = α
bi+1 = max{b < bi : and ub < ubi}
Pick formulas ϕi ∈ F such that bi = v(ϕi) and ubi = u(ϕi). By con-
struction the sequence ub0 , ub1 , ... is also strictly descending and ub0 = uα ≤
u(ϕ) < 1, thus by finiteness of F the inductive definition ends with some
bN (which could be b0 in case uα = 0). To check that bN = ubN = 0, assume
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Figure 2: Second Translation
bN = v(ϕN ) > 0, then ubN = u(ϕN ) > 0 = u(⊥) by property #5 above.
Since v(⊥) ≤ v(ϕN ) then by minimality of ubN we can not have equal-
ity, thus v(⊥) < v(ϕN ) and there exists bN+1 < bN , a contradiction.
Knowing v(⊥) = bN = 0, ubN ≤ u(⊥) = 0 by minimality again.
Fix ε > 0 such that α+ ε < 1 and define further (taking min ∅ = 1)
p0 = (α+ ε) ·min{v(✸θ) : θ ∈ F, α < v(✸θ)}
pi = bi+1 ·min{v(✸θ) : θ ∈ F, bi < v(✸θ)} for i ≥ 1.
We have then pi > bi by finiteness of F. Summing up,
1 > α+ ε ≥ p0 > b0 = α ≥ p1 > b1 ≥ .... ≥ pN > bN = 0.
1 > ub0 > ub1 > ... > ubN = 0
Now pick an strictly increasing function g : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] such that (see
Figure 2)
g(1) = 1
g[[uα, 1)] = [α, p0)
g[[ubi+1 , ubi)] = [bi+1, pi+1)
Then the valuation w = g ◦ u satisfies w(ThG✸) = 1, and so it belongs to
W. Moreover, for any θ ∈ F :
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i) If u(θ) = 1 then w(θ) = 1 by definition of w; hence, v(θ) ≤ w(θ).
In addition, v(✸θ) ≥ p0, otherwise v(✸θ) ≤ α = v(ϕ0) which would imply
u(θ) ≤ u(ϕ0) < 1 by #2, a contradiction.
ii) If u(θ) ∈ [ubi , ubi−1) or u(θ) = [ub0 , 1) then v(θ) ≤ w(θ) ≤ v(✸θ).
To see this notice first that w(θ) ∈ [bi, pi) by definition of g. Now, for i ≥ 1,
bi is the maximum v(ψ) with u(ψ) < ubi−1 therefore v(θ) ≤ bi ≤ w(θ).
In addition, for i = 0, v(θ) ≤ α = b0 ≤ w(θ) by #1. Moreover, if
u(θ) = ubi = u(ϕi) then w(θ) = bi = v(ϕi) ≤ v(✸θ) by #6, and if
u(θ) > ubi then v(✸θ) > v(ϕi) = bi by #4; hence, v(✸θ) ≥ pi > w(θ).
From (i,ii), it follows that infθ∈F {v(θ) ⇒ w(θ)} = 1 and
infθ∈F{w(θ) ⇒ v(✸θ)} ≥ p0. Hence S
F vw ≥ p0, and w(ϕ) = g(u(ϕ)) <
p0 ≤ α+ ε.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume v(✸ϕ) = α > 0.
Uϕ,v = {θ : v(✸θ) < α}
∪{ϑ2 → ϑ1 : v(✸ϑ1) < v(ϑ2) and v(✸ϑ1) < α}
∪{(ϑ1 → ϑ2)→ ϑ1 : v(✸ϑ1) = v(ϑ2) and v(✸ϑ1) < α}
this set is non-empty because v(✸⊥) = 0, moreover, for any ξ ∈ Uϕ,v we
have v(✸ξ) < α. For the first set by construction. For the second set of
axioms, because v(✸(ϑ2 → ϑ1)) ≤ v(ϑ2 → ✸ϑ1) = v(✸ϑ1) < α by FS1.
For the third, notice that v(✸((ϑ1 → ϑ2)→ ϑ1))) ≤ v((ϑ1 → ϑ2)→ ✸ϑ1)
≤ v((✸ϑ1 → ϑ2)→ ✸ϑ1) = v(✸ϑ1) < α by FS1, FS2.
We claim that for any finite {ξ1, . . . , ξk} ⊆ Uϕ,v :
ϕ 6⊢
G✷✸
ξ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ξk
because, on the contrary, ✸ϕ ⊢G✷✸ ✸(ξ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ξk) ⊢G✷✸ ✸ξ1 ∨ . . . ∨✸ξk or
✸ϕ, ThG✸ ⊢ ✸ξ1 ∨ . . . ∨✸ξk
and evaluating with v it would give: α = v(✸ϕ) ≤
max{v(✸ξ1), . . . , v(✸ξk)} < α, absurd.
Therefore, there is a valuation u such that u(ϕ) = u(TG✷✸) = 1 and
u(ξ) < 1 for each ξ ∈ Uϕ,v, which has the following consequences for any
θ, θ1, θ2:
##1. If v(✸θ) < α then u(θ) < 1 (because then θ ∈ Uϕ,.v)
##2. If v(✸θ1) < v(✷θ2) and v(✸θ1) < α then u(θ1) < u(θ2) (because
θ2 → θ1 ∈ Uϕ,.v)
##3. If v(✸θ1) ≤ v(θ2) and v(✸θ1) < α then u(θ1) ≤ u(θ2) (because
(θ1 → θ2)→ θ1 ∈ Uϕ,v)
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##4 If u(θ2) = 0 then v(✷θ2) = 0 (making θ1 := ⊥ in 2 and taking
counter-reciprocal)
##5. If v(✸θ1) = 0 then u(θ) = 0 (making θ2 := ⊥ in 3, because then
v(✸θ1) ≤ v(⊥) and v(✸θ1) < α).
We perform now a construction dual of the one we did in the proof of
Claim 1. Let C = {v(✸θ) ≤ α : θ ∈ F} and define for each c ∈ C
uc = max{u(θ) : θ ∈ F, v(✸θ) = c}.
Note that u0 = 0 by ##5 above, and uα = 1 because u(ϕ) = 1. Define an
ascending sequence 0 = c0 < c1 < .... in C as follows:
c0 = v(✸⊥) = 0
c1 = min{c ∈ C : c > c0 and uc > uc0}
c2 = min{c ∈ C : c > c1 and uc > uc1}
etc.
Choose ϕi such that uci = u(ϕi), ci = v(✸ϕi), clearly, 0 = uc0 < uc1 < ....
By finiteness of F the sequence of the ci ends necessarily with cN = α,
because ci = v(✸ϕi) < α implies uci = u(ϕi) < 1 = uα by ##1 above and
thus the existence of ci+1 ≤ α. This means also that ucn = 1.
Fix ε > 0 such that α− ε > cN−1, and define further (taking max ∅ = 0)
qN−1 = max{α− ε,max{v(θ) : v(θ) < cN}}
qi = max{ci,max{v(θ) : v(θ) < ci+1}}, for i < N − 1
then we have:
0 = c0 ≤ q0 < c1 ≤ q1 < ....cN−1 ≤ α− ε ≤ qN−1 < cN = α
0 = uc0 < uc1 < ..... < ucN = 1
Choose g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] to be any strictly increasing function such that
g(0) = 0
g[(uci , uci+1 ]] = (qi, ci+1] for i < N − 1
g[(ucN−1 , 1)] = (qN−1, α)
g(1) = 1
Then g is a Heyting homomorphism and the valuation w = g ◦ v satisfies
w(ϕ) = w(TG✷✸) = 1. Moreover, we have:
i) If v(✸θ) ≥ α then trivially (w(θ)⇒ v(✸θ)) ≥ α. In particular, (w(ϕ) ⇒
v(✸ϕ)) = (1⇒ v(✸ϕ)) = α.
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ii) If v(✸θ) < α then w(θ) ≤ v(✸θ). To see this consider cases. First:
u(θ) ∈ (uci , uci+1) for some i (recall u(θ) < 1 by ##1) then w(θ) ∈ (qi, ci+1].
As u(θ) > uci and ci+1 = v(✸ϕi+1) is the smallest v(✸ψ) with u(ψ) > uci
then v(✸θ) ≥ ci+1 ≥ w(θ). Second: u(θ) = 0 then w(θ) = 0 and v(✷θ) = 0
by ##4
iii) If v(θ) ≥ α then (v(θ) ⇒ w(θ)) > α − ε, because v(θ) > cN−1 =
v(✸ϕN−1) which implies u(θ) > u(ϕN−1) = ucN−1 by ##2, therefore
w(θ) > qN−1 ≥ α− ε by definition.
iv) v(θ) < α then v(θ) ≤ w(θ). To see this notice that ci ≤ v(θ) ≤
qi < ci+1 for some i and consider cases. First: v(θ) = ci = v(✸ϕi) then,
by ##3, uci = u(ϕi) ≤ u(θ). Therefore ci ≤ w(θ). That is, v(θ) ≤ w(θ).
Second: ci < v(θ) then, by ##2, uci < u(θ) and by definition qi ≤ w(θ),
which shows again v(θ) ≤ w(θ).
From (i,ii), we have infθ∈F {w(θ) ⇒ v(✸θ)} = α, and from (iii,iv),
infθ∈F{v(θ)⇒ w(θ)} ≥ α−ε. Hence, S
F vw ≥ α−ε and thus SF vw·w(ϕ) =
SF vw · α ≥ (α− ε). 
Lemma 3.2 (Weak completeness) For any finite theory T and formula
ϕ in L✸, T |=GK ϕ implies T ⊢G✸ ϕ.
Proof: Assume T is finite and T 6⊢G✸ ϕ then T, ThG✸ 6⊢G ϕ by Lemma 2.1
and thus there is by Proposition 2.1 a Go¨del valuation v : V ar ∪X → [0, 1]
such that v(ϕ) < v(T ) = v(ThG✸) = 1. Let F be the set of subformulas
of formulas in T ∪ {ϕ} (including ⊥ ), then v ∈ W. the set of worlds of
the canonical model MF and by Lemma 3.1, e
F (v, T ) = v(T ) = 1 and
eF (v, ϕ) = v(ϕ) < 1, thus T 6|=GK ϕ.
To prove strong completeness we utilize compactness of first order clas-
sical logic and the following result of Horn:
Lemma 3.3 ( [19], Lemma 3.7) Any countable linear order (P,<) may be
embedded in (Q ∩ [0, 1], <) preserving all joins and meets existing in P .
Theorem 3.1 (Strong completeness) For any countable theory T and
formula ϕ in L✸, T ⊢G✸ ϕ if and only if T |=GK ϕ.
Proof: Assume T is countable and T 0G✸ ϕ. Consider the first order theory
T ∗ with two unary relation symbols W,P, binary <, constant symbols 0, 1,
and c, function symbols x ◦ y, S(x, y), and fθ(x) for each θ ∈ L✸(V ) where
V is the set of propositional variables of T, and having for axioms:
∀x¬(Wx ∧ Px)
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(P,<) is a strict linear order with minimum 0 and maximum 1
∀x∀y(W (x) ∧W (y)→ P (S(x, y)))
∀x∀y(P (x) ∧ P (y)→ (x ≤ y ∧ x ◦ y = 1) ∨ (x > y ∧ x ◦ y = y))
∀x(W (x)→ f⊥(x) = 0)
for each θ, ψ ∈ L✸ :
∀x(W (x)→ P (fθ(x)))
∀x(W (x)→ fθ∧ψ(x) = min{fθ(x), fψ(x)})
∀x(W (x)→ fθ→ψ(x) = (fϕ(x) ◦ fψ(x))
∀x(W (x)→ fθ(x) = infy(S(x, y) ◦ fθ(y))
∀x(W (x)→ f✸θ(x) = supy(min{S(x, y), fθ(y)})
W (c) ∧ (fϕ(c) < 1)
for each θ ∈ T : fθ(c) = 1
For each finite part t of this theory let Σt = {θ : fθ ∈ t}. Since
Σt ∩ T 0G✸ ϕ by hypothesis then by weak completeness there is a GK-
model MΣ = (WΣ, SΣ, eΣ) and a ∈ WΣ such that eΣ(a, θ) = 1 for
each θ ∈ Σt ∩ T and eΣ(a, ϕ) < 1. Therefore the first order structure
(WΣ ⊔ [0, 1],WΣ, [0, 1], <, 0, 1, a,⇒, SΣ , fθ)θ∈L✸ , with fθ : WΣ → [0, 1] de-
fined as fθ(x) = eΣ(x, θ), is clearly a model of t. By compactness of first or-
der logic and the downward Lo¨wenheim theorem T ∗ has a countable model
M∗ = (B,W,P,<, 0, 1, a, ◦, S, fθ )θ∈L✸ . Using Horn’s lemma [19], (P,<)
may be embedded in (Q ∩ [0, 1], <) preserving 0, 1, and all suprema and
infima existing in P ; therefore, we may assume without loss of generality
that the ranges of the functions S and fθ are contained in [0, 1]. Then, it is
straightforward to verify that M = (W,S, e), where e(x, θ) = fθ(x) for all
x ∈W, is a GK-model such that M |=a T, and M 6|=a ϕ, that is, T 6|=GK ϕ.
The rest follows from Theorem 2.1. 
We can not expect a similar result for uncountable theories by the obser-
vation after Proposition 2.1. If we allow non-standard values, for example
HK-models where H is an adequate ultrapower of [0,1], we may obtain
strong completeness for entailment of uncountable theories up to certain
cardinality. However,
Proposition 3.1 There is no single linearly ordered Heyting algebra H giv-
ing strong completeness with respect to HK models for theories of arbitrary
power, even in Go¨del-Dummet logic.
Proof: Assume otherwise, then H would be infinite (by the old Go¨del ar-
gument). Let κ be a cardinal greater than |H| and consider the theory
T = {(pβ → pα) → q : α < β < κ}, then T |=HK q because v(T ) = 1
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with v(q) < 1 would imply v(pβ → pα) < 1 and thus v(pα) < v(pβ)
for α < β < κ, which is impossible by cardinality considerations. On
the other hand, T 0G✷✸ q, otherwise we would have ∆ ⊢G✷✸ q and thus
∆ |=HK q, for some finite set ∆ = {(pαi+1 → pαi) → q : 1 ≤ i < n},
which is impossible because any valuation v(q) = h, v(pαi) = hi where
h1 < h2 < ... < hn+1 < h < 1 makes v((pαi+1 → pαi) → q) = 1 for
1 ≤ i < n. 
4 Optimal models, modal axioms
To extend the completeness theorem to the [0,1]-valued analogues of the
classical bi-modal systems T, S4, S5 we introduce a particular kind of GK-
model, their advantage being that the many-valued counterpart of classical
structural properties of frames may be characterized in them by the validity
of the corresponding classical schemes.
Given a GK-model M = (W,S, e), define a new accessibility relation
S+xy = Sxy· S✸xy, where Sxy = infϕ∈L✸{e(x,✷ϕ) ⇒ e(y, ϕ)}, and
S✸xy = infϕ∈L✸{e(y, ϕ) ⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)}, and call M optimal if S
+ = S.
The following lemma shows that any model is equivalent to an optimal
one.
Lemma 4.1 (W,S+, e) is optimal and if e+ is the extension of e in this
model then e+(x, ϕ) = e(x, ϕ) for any ϕ ∈ L✸.
Proof: The first claim follows from the second which is proven by a straight-
forward induction on formulas. The only non trivial step is that of the
modal connectives. Notice first that Sxy ≤ S+xy, because e(x,✷ϕ) ≤
(Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)) and Sxy · e(y, ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ) for any ϕ, thus Sxy ≤
(e(x,✷ϕ) ⇒ e(y, ϕ)), (e(y, ϕ) ⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)). Now, assume e+(y, ϕ) = e(y, ϕ)
for all y then by the first observation and the induction hypothesis,
e+(x,ϕ) = infy{S
+xy ⇒ e+(y, ϕ)} ≤ infy{Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)} = e(x,ϕ).
But S+xy ≤ (e(x,ϕ) ⇒ e(y, ϕ)) by definition of S+ and thus e(x,ϕ) ≤
(S+xy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)) = (S+xy ⇒ e+(y, ϕ)) which yields e(x,ϕ) ≤ e+(x,ϕ).
Similarly, by the induction hypothesis and the first observation, e+(x,✸ϕ) =
supy{S
+xy · e(y, ϕ)} ≥ supy{Sxy · e(y, ϕ)} = e(x,✸ϕ), and by definition
S+xy ≤ (e(y, ϕ) ⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)) and thus S+xy · e+(y, ϕ) = S+xy · e(y, ϕ) ≤
e(x,✸ϕ) which yields e+(x,✸ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ). 
Call a GK-frame M = 〈W,S〉 reflexive if Sxx = 1 for all x ∈ W ,
transitive if Sxy · Syz ≤ Sxz for all x, y, z, and symmetric if Sxy = Syx for
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all x, y ∈W. Let Ref , Trans, and Symm denote, respectively, the classes of
GK- models over frames satisfying each one of the above properties. These
are the fuzzy versions of the corresponding classical properties of frames
characterized by the following pairs of modal axioms:
T. ✷ϕ→ ϕ T✸. ϕ→ ✸ϕ reflexivity
4. ✷ϕ→ ✷✷ϕ 4✸. ✸✸ϕ→ ✸ϕ transitivity
M1. ϕ→ ✸ϕ M2. ✸ϕ→ ϕ symmetry
(3)
We will see that these axioms characterize also the fuzzy versions in optimal
models.
Lemma 4.2 i) T and T✸ are valid in Ref . ii) 4 and 4✸ are valid in
Trans. iii) M1 and M2 are valid in Symm.
Proof: i) In reflexive models, e(x,✷ϕ) ≤ (Sxx ⇒ e(x, ϕ)) = e(x, ϕ) and
e(x,✸ϕ) ≥ Sxx · e(x, ϕ) = e(x, ϕ) for any x. Thus e(x,✷ϕ → ϕ) = 1 =
e(x, ϕ→ ✸ϕ).
ii) In transitive models e(x,✷ϕ) · Sxy · Syz ≤ [(Sxz ⇒ e(z, ϕ)) · Sxz] ≤
e(z, ϕ) for all x, y, z. Hence, e(x,✷ϕ) · Sxy ≤ (Syz ⇒ e(z, ϕ)) and thus
e(x,✷ϕ) · Sxy ≤ e(y,✷ϕ); therefore, e(x,✷ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(y,✷ϕ)) for all
y and thus e(x,✷ϕ) ≤ e(x,✷✷ϕ) which yields 4. Also Sxy · Syz · e(z, ϕ)
≤ Sxz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ). Hence, Syz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)) and
thus e(x,✸ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)); therefore, Sxy · e(x,✸ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ))
for all y and thus e(x,✸✸ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ) which gives 4✸. iii) In symmetric
models, Sxy · e(x, ϕ) = Syx · e(x, ϕ) ≤ e(y,✸ϕ) for all x, y, then e(x, ϕ) ≤
(Sxy ⇒ e(y,✸ϕ)) and thus e(x, ϕ) ≤ e(y,✸ϕ)) which is M1. Moreover,
e(y,ϕ) ≤ (Syx⇒ e(x, ϕ)), thus Sxy · e(y,ϕ) = Syx · e(y,ϕ) ≤ e(x, ϕ)
and thus e(x,✸ϕ) ≤ e(x, ϕ) which is M2. 
Proposition 4.1 Let M be an optimal GK-model, then i) It is reflexive if
and only if it validates the schemes T+T✸. ii) It is transitive if and only if
it validates 4 + 4✸. iii) It is symmetric if and only if it validates M1+M2.
Proof: i) By optimality, Sxx = infϕ{e(x,ϕ→ ϕ)} · infϕ{e(x, ϕ→ ✸ϕ)} =
1 if T,T✸ hold in M . ii) By definition,
Sxy · Syz ≤ (e(x,ϕ)⇒ e(y,ϕ)) · (e(y,ϕ)⇒ e(z, ϕ))
≤ (e(x,ϕ)⇒ e(z, ϕ)) ≤ (e(x,ϕ) ⇒ e(z, ϕ)),
the last inequality holding by 4. Similarly
S✸xy · S✸yz ≤ (e(y,✸ϕ) ⇒ e(x,✸✸ϕ)) · (e(z, ϕ)⇒ e(y,✸ϕ))
≤ (e(z, ϕ) ⇒ e(x,✸✸ϕ)) ≤ (e(z, ϕ)⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)
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the last inequality holding by 4✸, and taking meet over ϕ in the right we
get transitivity. iii) since Sxy ≤ (e(x,✸ϕ) ⇒ e(y,✸ϕ)) ≤ (e(x, ϕ) ⇒
e(y,✸ϕ)) by M1, then taking meet over ϕ, we obtain Sxy ≤ S✸yx. Simi-
larly, S✸yx ≤ (e(x,ϕ) ⇒ e(y,✸ϕ)) ≤ (e(x,ϕ) ⇒ e(y, ϕ)) by M2, and
then S✸yx ≤ Sxy. From this, S✸xy = Syx, and thus Sxy = Syx. 
Remark. The notion of optimality and all the results in this section
make sense and hold for HK-models, for any complete Heyting algebra H.
5 Go¨del analogues of classical bi-modal systems
Lemma 4.1 in conjunction with Proposition 4.1 implies strong completeness
of any combination of the axiom pairs in table 3 with respect to GK-frames
satisfying the associated structural properties. In particular, we have for
the analogues of the classical modal systems T, S4 and S5:
GT✸ := G✸ + T + T✸
GS4✸ := GT✸ + 4 + 4✸
GS5✸ := GS4✸ +M1 +M2.
Theorem 5.1 i) GT✸ is strongly complete for |=Ref . ii) GS4✸ is
strongly complete for |=Ref∩Trans . iii) GS5✸ is strongly complete for
|=Ref∩Trans∩Symm.
Proof: i) If T |=Ref ϕ then T |=Optimal∩Ref ϕ, thus T +{T, T✸} |=Optimal ϕ
by Proposition 4.1, and T + {T, T✸} |=GK ϕ by Lemma 4.1.Therefore,
T + {T, T✸} ⊢G✸ ϕ, which implies T ⊢GT✸ ϕ. Here, we have used {...}
to denote the set of all instances of the schemes within the brackets. The
proofs of (ii) and (iii) are similar. 
After some calculation GS5✸ may be seen deductively equivalent to
Prior’s and Bull system MIPC [26], [4] plus the prelinearity axiom (ϕ →
ψ)∨(ψ → ϕ). This system presents some interesting features with respect to
its Go¨del-Kripke semantics, given by GK-frames (W,S) where S is a fuzzy
equivalence relation. Although the uni-modal fragments of GT✸ and GS4✸
are axiomatizable by the double negation shift axioms and the proper axioms
in 3, as shown [6], the intrinsic axiomatization of the uni-modal fragments of
GS5✸ remains open. Moreover, in distinction of the other modal systems
here considered, the -fragment of GS5✸ is not characterized by models
with crisp accessibility relation, as the following example illustrates.
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Example The formula (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ϕ ∨ψ) is not a theorem of GS5
but it is valid in any accessibility-crisp model of GS5. The first claim is
granted by the following counter model:
u{p = 13 , q =
1
2}
w
{p = 1, q = 0}
v {p = 12 , q = 1}
1
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
3
in which the reader may verify that e(u,(p∨q) = 12 and e(u,p∨q) =
1
3 .
To prove the second claim notice that if (W,S, e) ∈ Ref∩Trans∩Symm has
crisp S, this defines a classical equivalence relation ∼ and thus e(x,ϕ) =
infy{Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)} = infy∼x{e(y, ϕ)} for any formula ϕ. Therefore,
e(x,(ϕ ∨ ψ)) = infy∼x{infz∼y e(z, ϕ) g e(y, ϕ)}, but {z : z ∼ y} = {z :
z ∼ x} and so αy = infz∼y e(z, ϕ) is independent of y for any y ∼ x; hence,
e(x,(ϕ∨ψ)) = infy∼x{αge(y, ϕ)} = αginfy∼x{e(y, ϕ)} = e(x,ϕ∨ψ)
by properties of [0, 1].
6 The algebraic connection
As an algebrizable deductive logic, G✸ has a unique algebraic semantics
given by the variety of bi-modal Go¨del algebras A = (G, I,K) where G
is a Go¨del algebra and I and K are unary operations in G satisfying the
identities:
I(a · b) = Ia · Ib K(ag b) = KagKb
I1 = 1 K0 = 0
Ka→ Ib ≤ I(a→ b) K(a→ b) ≤ Ia→ Kb
This means that G✸ is complete with respect to valuations v : V ar → A
in these algebras, when they are extend to L✸ interpreting  and ✸ by I
and K, respectively.
Similarly, GT✸, GS4✸, and GS5✸ have for algebraic semantic the
subvarieties of bi-modal Go¨del algebras determined by the corresponding
pairs of identities in the following table:
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Ia ≤ a a ≤ Ka reflexivity
Ia = IIa Ka = KKa transitivity
a ≤ IKa KIa ≤ a symmetry
(4)
Notice that the algebraic models of GS4✸ are just the bi-topological pseudo-
Boolean algebras of Ono [24] with linear underlying Heyting algebra, and
the algebraic models of GS5✸ are the the monadic Heyting algebras of
Monteiro and Varsavsky [23], utilized later by Bull and Fischer Servi to
interpret MIPC, with a Go¨del basis. It is proper to call them monadic
Go¨del algebras.
Example. As we have noticed, there is no finite counter-model for the
formula ✷¬¬p → ¬¬✷p in Go¨del-Kripke semantics. However, the algebra
A = ({0, a, 1}, I,K) where {0 < a < 1} is the three elements Go¨del algebra
and I1 = 1, Ia = I0 = 0, K1 = Ka = 1, K0 = 0 is a bi-modal Go¨del algebra
(actually a monadic Heyting algebra) providing a finite counterexample to
the validity of the formula by means of the valuation v(p) = a, as the reader
may verify.
We may associate to each Go¨del-Kripke frame F = (W,S) a bi-modal
Go¨del algebra [0, 1]F = ([0, 1]W , IF ,KF ) where [0, 1]W is the product Go¨del
algebra, and for each map f ∈ [0, 1]W :
IF (f)(w) = inf
w′∈W
(Sww′ ⇒ f(w′))
KF(f)(w) = sup
w′∈W
(Sww′ · f(w′))
Theorem 6.1 [0, 1]F is a bi-modal Go¨del algebra, and there is a one to
one correspondence between Go¨del Kripke models over F , and valuations
v : V ar→ [0, 1]F given by the adjunction:
V ar ×W
e
→ [0, 1] ↔ V ar
ve→ [0, 1]W , ve(p) = e(−, p)
so that for any formula ϕ, ve(ϕ) = e(−, ϕ).
Moreover, the transformation F 7−→ [0, 1]F preserves reflexivity, transi-
tivity and symmetry. Thus, it send Go¨del-Kripke frames for GT✸, GS4✸,
and GS5✸ into algebraic models for the same logics.
Proof: The verification of the identities that IF , KF must satisfy in each
case is routine and the induction in formulas showing ve(ϕ)(w) = e(w,ϕ) is
straightforward. 
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Call an algebra of the form [0, 1]F a Go¨del complex algebra. Going from
algebras to GK-models seems more difficult. However, utilizing a refinement
of our strong completeness theorem for Go¨del-Kripke semantics we may
associate to each countable bi-modal Go¨del algebra A a GK-frame FA such
that A may be embedded in the associated algebra [0, 1]FA , and to each
algebraic valuation η in A a GK-model over FA validating the same formulas
as η.
Call a theory T ⊆ L✸ normal if T ⊢G✸ θ implies T ⊢G✸ θ and T
⊢G✸ θ → ρ implies T ⊢G✸ ✸θ → ✸ρ.
It T is normal, then for each finite fragment F the proof of the Lemma
3.1 goes through for the submodel MTF = (W
T , SF , eF ) of the canonical
model where W T = {v ∈ W : v(T ) = 1}. Hence, if Σ is a finite subset of T
such that Σ 6⊢G✸ ϕ there is a canonical model M
T
F such that e
F (v,Σ) = 1
and eF (v, ϕ) < 1 (take F ⊇ Σ ∪ {ϕ}).
Lemma 6.1 If T is a countable normal theory there is GK-model MT such
that T ⊢G✸ ϕ if and only if MT |= ϕ.
Proof: From the previous observation, and utilizing a compactness argument
as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we may pick for each ϕ such that T 6⊢G✸ ϕ a
modelMϕ = 〈Wϕ, Sϕ, eϕ〉 such that eϕ(w, T ) = 1 for all w and e(wϕ, ϕ) < 1.
Define MT = (W,S, e) where W = ∐ϕWϕ, Sww
′ = Sϕww
′ if w,w′ ∈ Wϕ
and 0 otherwise, and e(w, p) = eϕ(w, p) for w ∈ Wϕ. It is easily verified by
induction in the complexity of θ that e(w, θ) = eϕ(w, θ) for any w ∈ Wϕ.
Since MT |= T then T ⊢G✸ ϕ implies MT |= ϕ; reciprocally, if T 6⊢G✸ ϕ
then e(wϕ, ϕ) = eϕ(wϕ, ϕ) < 1 by construction and thus MT 6|= ϕ. 
Theorem 6.2 For any countable bi-modal Go¨del algebra A there is Go¨del
frame FA = (W,S) such that:
i) A is embeddable in the Go¨del complex algebra [0, 1]FA .
ii) For any valuation v : V ar → A there is a ev : W × V ar→ [0, 1] such
that v(ϕ) = 1 if and only if (W,S, ev) |= ϕ.
Proof: Fix a valuation η into A with onto extension η : L✸ → A and let
T = {θ : η(θ) = 1}, then T is normal and for the model MT = (W,S, e)
of the previous theorem we have η(ϕ) = 1 if and only if e(w,ϕ) = 1 for all
w ∈W.
(i) By Theorem 6.1, e induces a bi-modal Go¨del valuation ve : V ar →
[0, 1](W,S), ve(p) = e(−, p) such that ve(ϕ) = e(−, ϕ) = 1 ∈ [0, 1]
W if
an only if η(ϕ) = 1 by the observation above. This means that the
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extension ve : L✸ → [0, 1]
(W,S) factors injectively through η; that is,
ve = δ ◦ η for an injective homomorphism of bi-modal Go¨del algebras
δ : A → [0, 1](W,S),which shows (i). To see (ii) let v : V ar → A, then
δ ◦ v is a valuation into [0, 1](W,S) which induces, by Theorem 6.1, a GK-
valuation ev : W × V ar → [0, 1] such that ev(w,ϕ) = δ(v(ϕ))(w). As δ is
one to one we have that v(ϕ) = 1 if and only if δ(v(ϕ)) = 1 ∈ [0, 1]W ; that
is, ev(w,ϕ) = 1 for all w, which means (W,S, eµv) |= ϕ. 
Applying part (i) of the previous theorem to the free bi-modal algebra
of countable rank we obtain:
Theorem 6.3 The complex algebras generate the variety of bi-modal Go¨del
algebras. A similar result holds for the subvarieties determined by any com-
bination of identities in (4).
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